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OS REGISTRY

1 DEC 1987

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Announcement of Next Meeting and Proposed
Agenda Items

FROM:

Chief, Policy and Plans Staff
Office of Security

EXTENSION

NO.

05 7-2255

DATE

30 November 1987

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALSCOMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

EO/OS

30 NOV
1987

30 Nov

2.

DD/PS

NOV 30
1987

12/1

3.

D/OS

4.

OS Registry

12/1/87

5.

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To #3:

I will get on your calendar
and fill you in on all this
well ahead of our meeting.

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Personnel Security Committee

Washington, D.C. 20505

1 DEC 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Personnel Security Committee
IG/CM(P)

FROM:

[REDACTED]

25X1

Chairman, Personnel Security Committee

SUBJECT:

Announcement of Next Meeting and
Proposed Agenda Items [REDACTED]

25X1

1. The Personnel Security Committee will meet on Monday,
14 December 1987, from 1030-1200 hours in [REDACTED]

25X1

Members should be prepared to discuss issues noted in paragraph
2a and b below. [REDACTED]

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2. Status of Initiatives Pertaining to the President's and
SSCI's Reports

a. Attachment A summarizes the status of initiatives
stemming from the President's and SSCI's reports as
recently reported to the Chairman, Interagency
Group/Countermeasures (P). Review of this report will
provide members a fairly comprehensive picture of where we
stand with respect to all PSC-related action items.
Though most actions are already in motion and have achieved
various stages of development, others have not been acted
upon, and require group review, discussion, and assignment
for followup.

b. To ease identification, these particular items
have been removed from the IG/CM(P) report and grouped in
Attachment B. Members are requested to give careful
consideration to each of these remaining items and be
prepared to advise the PSC on responsibilities and
prerogatives their agencies may have regarding
implementation of these trailing recommendations. I would
like to reach general agreement regarding who, how and by
when these taskings will be addressed, and if appropriate,
developed and implemented. [REDACTED]

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3. Personnel Security Research Subcommittee (PSRS)

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I have asked [] to brief members on the current status of programs and activities either underway or planned by the Research Subcommittee. []

4. Updated PSC Membership List

Attachment C is a 1986 listing of PSC membership. Members are requested to annotate the listing, as necessary, with updated information and provide it to [] PSC Executive Secretary, at the 14 December meeting. []

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5. Members and alternates who have attended previous meetings need not recertify their clearances; however, new attendees should provide their names, social security numbers, and clearances by 10 December 1987 to []

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Attachments

!OS/PB/PPS, [] (30 Nov 87)

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!Distribution:!

! Orig - (See Attached List)!:

- ! 1 - OS Registry!
- ! 1 - C/Policy!
- ! 1 - D/S Chrono!
- ! 1 - PPS Chrono!

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Personnel Security Committee
Washington, D.C. 20505

27 OCT 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Interagency Group/Countermeasures (P)

VIA: Director, Community Counterintelligence
and Security Countermeasures Staff

FROM: [REDACTED] STAT
Chairman, Personnel Security Committee

SUBJECT: Status of Personnel Security Committee Efforts
on Implementation of Actions Directed in
the President's Report and the SSCI Report

Listed below are items from the President's Report and the SSCI Report on which the Personnel Security Committee is taking action. Following each item is a note on current status and planned action. The recommendations and responses are keyed to the 24 October 1986 memorandum from the Chairman, IG/CM(P). [REDACTED]

I. ENHANCE PROFESSIONALISM OF THE WORK FORCE

A. Improve Career Development

2. Expedite review and revision of Security Administration Series (GS-080). [REDACTED] STAT

P. 17, President's report. Lead: PSC - OPM

° The Office of Personnel Management recently disseminated a revised draft. Formal publication is expected in December. PSC members will review and characterize for the record what benefits have accrued from its publication and what future benefits are likely. [REDACTED]

3. Recommend to the NSC practical measures to enhance professionalism of the DoD security work force that are applicable throughout the Federal Service. [REDACTED]

STAT

P. 17 President's report. Lead: PSC - OSD-OPM

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STAT

STAT

° The Security Awareness and Education Subcommittee is continuing to develop plans to improve training and education, along with awareness, by improving the skills of the educators, the availability of the products, the production of new products, and by pooling available resources to the extent possible. []

STAT

B. Improve Training

2. Consider phased assignment of national responsibilities for security training to the Defense Security Institute, with an interagency group including representatives from US counterintelligence agencies to develop security awareness materials and with a West Coast annex. []

STAT

P. 331, SSCI report (Item 60)
Lead: PSC

° Future tasks of the PSC will be to assign national responsibilities along the lines suggested.

3. Establish government-wide security training objectives and require minimum levels of training and certification for industrial security officers, clearance adjudicators, and other positions requiring consistent standards.

P. 331, SSCI report (Item 59). Lead: PSC

° DoD has established minimum training courses for the facility security officer (FSO) based on recommendations by the cognizant security officer for the facility. As a minimum, the FSO will complete the Essentials of Industrial Security Management correspondence course and attend an Industrial Security Management Course conducted by DoDSI within 12 months of acquiring safeguarding capability. Additional requirements of the recommendation will be reviewed by the PSC in the future.

5. Accelerate development of education and training programs for DOD civilian and military employees and contractors, and make course materials available to all interested agencies. []

STAT

P. 18, President's report. Lead: PSC - OSD-SAES

° The Security Awareness and Education Subcommittee (SAES) is continuing to develop ideas and to scope existing programs to maximize coordination of effort and assistance to agencies which may wish to enhance their contractor programs. The SAES will seek to identify training aids and services not available in existing programs and methods for sharing products, production resources and information. []

STAT

6. Ensure appropriate training for certified security managers and other security specialists in the Security Administration Series GS-080, consistent with the findings of the current OPM occupational study of that series. []

STAT

P. 18, President's report. Lead PSC - OSD-OPM

° The Security Awareness and Education Subcommittee has been tasked with developing additional training recommendations. The Director of OPM plans to examine the entire spectrum of conditions affecting the employment of security professionals to include benefits, quality of life in general, pay incentives, promotional opportunities, etc. []

STAT

C. INCREASE SECURITY AWARENESS

1.a. Each agency vigorously implement NSDD-197. []

STAT

PP. 19 and 27, President's report. Lead: PSC

° As previously reported, the SAES has reviewed the results of the report made to the NSC on the status of security awareness programs from the agencies required to report. SAES continues to focus their efforts on providing practical assistance to agencies in maintaining current and effective security awareness programs.

NSDD 197 also required the reporting of contacts with Soviet and Soviet Bloc nationals. Requirements for reporting foreign contacts are included in the new Executive Order on standards for access to classified information. []

STAT

1.b. Reinforce the provisions of NSDD-197 (1985) to place greater emphasis on security awareness and education programs. []

STAT

P. 19 and 27, President's report. Lead: PSC

° A two-day planning session was held in April to develop an agenda for actions to be taken. The SAES focused on trainer skills, products availability, production of new products and pooling of resources. SAES is developing a model training curriculum. One item previously considered but believed unnecessary at this time is the development of new standards for security awareness programs. The existing NSDD 197, DCID 1/14 and pending ISOO Directive #2 are seen as sufficient.

3. Strengthen interagency procedures for bringing possible espionage cases to the FBI's attention in a timely manner. The FBI should also be informed when employees with access to extremely sensitive information, such as Howard and Pelton, resign or are dismissed under circumstances indicating potential motivations for espionage.

P. 316, SSCI report (Item 13).

° A Memorandum of Understanding is pending between CIA and the FBI that will establish mutually agreed upon standards and procedures for the timely transmittal of Counterintelligence Information to the FBI by the CIA. In addition, IG/CM(P) members were briefed by CIA representatives as to the changes effected in handling problem cases such as Edward Lee Howard.

4. Monitor and report annually on accomplishments in strengthening awareness in the contractual sector.

STAT

P. 19, President's report. Lead: PSC

° SAES was assigned primary responsibility for this task. At the April planning session, SAES determined that our efforts in the federal arena should produce sufficient spinoff material which can be readily applied to the contractor sector. Along with ISOO, SAES is looking for better ways to disseminate the product to both government and contractor consumers.

STAT

D. IMPROVE MANAGEMENT

2. Emphasize commander and manager responsibility for security, including government-wide application of the recent DoD action to incorporate security into performance evaluations and development of more realistic and consistent policies for disciplinary sanctions.

STAT

P. 330, SSCI report (Item 57)
Lead: PSC

° The PSC will ensure implementation government-wide. Continuing reliability programs in DoD (possibly of even greater merit than some reinvestigations) will also be reviewed.

3. Assess requirements for research and analysis on security countermeasures to promote aggressive and balanced efforts government-wide, especially on personnel security.

P. 330, SSCI report (Item 56)
Lead: PSC

STAT

- ° The Personnel Security Research Subcommittee has undertaken this recommendation with results expected in early to mid 1988.

II. SAFEGUARD INFORMATION WHOSE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE COULD JEOPARDIZE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

B. IMPROVING INFORMATION SECURITY

11.c. Ensure that agencies use all appropriate remedies against employees who violate the law and security regulations. [REDACTED]

STAT

P. 28 President's report. Lead: PSC

- ° The new Executive Order on standards for access to classified information is expected to address this problem; we will have to wait to see what role, if any, the PSC may have in assisting agencies in this regard. [REDACTED]

STAT

C. UPGRADING PERSONNEL SECURITY

1.a. Expedite the preparation and promulgation of an Executive Order, applicable to all people with access, which directs common standards for determining need and eligibility for access, for the process of investigation and reinvestigation at all levels of classification, for adjudication of investigative results, for continuing evaluation of personnel with security clearances, and which provides for effective national-level oversight of these procedures. [REDACTED]

STAT

P. 27, President's report. Lead: DoJ

- ° The Executive Order is near completion at DoJ. [REDACTED]

1.c. Prepare an executive branch plan, in consultation with civil liberties experts, for requiring those who receive access to the most sensitive information to agree to expanded post-access foreign travel reporting obligations and/or agency access to relevant financial and travel records. Such a plan should incorporate reasonable safeguards regarding the use of the information.

STAT

P. 333, SSCI report (Item 69). Lead: PSC

- ° Future PSC tasks will consider this recommendation.

1.d. Require that all cleared employees (including contractors) notify the security office of their respective agencies of all personal foreign travel before departure. []

P. 27, President's report. Lead: PSC

° Existing regulations and procedures for notification of foreign travel, records keeping, and for guidance and briefings for travelers regarding the threat, provocations, etc. have been received from IG/CM(P) members. SAES will now utilize this information to develop a model program which agencies can adapt to their needs. []

STAT

3. Establish procedures for continuously assessing the reliability--including financial vulnerability--of individuals with access to programs of unusual sensitivity. []

STAT

P. 27, President's report. Lead: PSC

° Future tasks of the PSC will include developing guidance for agencies to use in improving existing programs or in implementing them, as needed. []

STAT

5.a. Intensify personnel security research to develop more productive and, when possible, less costly investigative techniques and more specific guidelines for determinations of eligibility for access. To the extent that such research leads to major changes in the methodology of judging an individual's bona fides, determine the advisability and feasibility of setting a common investigative scope for Top Secret and SCI access. []

STAT

P. 27, President's report. Lead: PSC

° The Personnel Security Research Subcommittee chaired by DoD/OSD with representatives from CIA and OPM has surveyed existing and planned personnel security research. There are a considerable number of ongoing programs addressing personnel security as well as polygraph issues. []

STAT

5.b. Develop procedures for the rapid transmission to agencies concerned of criminal justice information on the public record available to DOJ when Justice is aware that it concerns employees or contractors who may hold security clearances. []

STAT

P. 27, President's report. Lead: PSC - FBI

• The FBI has surveyed selected consumer agencies to determine which of several alternative systems (or combinations thereof) would be most favored. The end product will probably consist of guidance for agencies regarding the available information and alternative ways of expeditiously obtaining it. []

STAT

5.c. Increase personnel security research, including expanded research and evaluation on the wider use of psychological testing in the clearance process, taking full account of individual rights, as well as implications of recent espionage cases. []

STAT

P. 333-334, SSCI report (Item 70) Lead: PSC

• Pursuant to a similar recommendation in the President's Report, the PSC has significantly expanded emphasis on personnel research. DoD and CIA have embarked on greatly enhanced research programs. CIA is presently making better use of existing psychological testing in the clearance process, largely through better coordination between medical and security components with adjudicative responsibilities.

5.d. Improve the adjudication process for granting or denying security clearances, with (a) more rigorous standards regarding persons who have committed felony offenses; (b) follow-up measures where persons with admitted problems like drug use are cleared; and (c) a government-wide requirement for training of adjudicators. (d) For the most sensitive positions, a "select in" policy based on demonstrated aptitude for security should be adopted in place of the current "select out" policy based on the absence of proved disqualifying factors. []

STAT

P. 334, SSCI report (Item 72). Lead: PSC

• Future PSC tasks will consider: the "whole person" philosophy of adjudication, preventing a "least common denominator" system and allowing agencies to tailor their programs to suit individual needs, and further study of the "select in"/"select out" policy.

6.a. Reach agreement on a "single scope" background investigation for all Top Secret and SCI clearances. The uniform policy should provide for: (a) less costly and more timely background investigations and clearances; (b) highest priority for meeting the five-year reinvestigation requirement; and (c) a subject interview in all cases. []

STAT

P. 332, SSCI report (Item 64) Lead: PSC

- ° PSC is supporting research to determine the value of various investigative scopes and techniques. Future PSC tasks will call for changes in the background investigation which result in greater economy while preserving the value of the information which is developed.

6.b. Postpone implementation of the proposal for one-time, short duration access by cleared personnel to the next higher level of classified information until Secret clearance requirements and investigations are upgraded and the IG/CM(P) has reviewed the issue.

P. 333, SSCI report (Item 68) Lead: PSC

- ° DoD has postponed implementation of the proposal. A credit check has been added by DoD to upgrade the investigation for access to Secret material. Future PSC tasks will address this recommendation.

7. Ensure substantially increased funding for personnel security in all relevant departments and agencies. A government-wide plan should be submitted to Congress to achieve the following goals: (a) elimination of the reinvestigation backlog for Top Secret (including SCI) within four years; and (b) implementation within less than ten years of a program for intensified investigation and reinvestigation for Secret clearances.

P. 332, SSCI report (Item 63) Lead: PSC

- ° While this recommendation is intended to cover all investigative agencies of the executive branch, DoD has the major problem because it conducts about 90% of all personnel security investigations. The DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 mandates a reduction of 542 DIS personnel by FY89. It can be assumed that this reduction will adversely affect the realization of both (a) and (b). PSC will continue to review this recommendation.

8. Establish government-wide standards for the use of contractors to conduct personnel field investigations, including requirements for supervision and quality control, restrictions on use of information, exclusion of contractors from adjudication decisions, and standards for experimentation with new procedures for less sensitive clearances.

STAT

P. 332, SSCI report (Item 65). Lead: PSC

- ° Future PSC tasks will establish the government-wide standards recommended.

9.b. Reduce the number of clearances held by industry. The DoD goal of a ten percent reduction in FY 1986 should be applied by the DCI (for SCI programs) and the Secretary of Energy.

P. 344, SSCI report (Item 107) Lead: PSC

° Future PSC tasks will address this recommendation as it applies to the DCI and the Secretary of Energy.

10.a. Establish more effective means for investigating and clearing immigrant aliens and foreign nationals overseas who are granted access to classified information. []

STAT

P. 333, SSCI report (Item 67) Lead: PSC

° This will be a coordinated effort involving primarily State, FBI, DoD, OPM and CIA.

10.b. Ensure full coordination of departmental policies and practices for the use of polygraphing in personnel security screening, to maintain stringent quality controls and safeguards for individual rights, to prevent over-reliance on this technique, to provide for necessary research and funding, and to improve understanding of the procedures. []

STAT

P. 335, SSCI report (Item 74). Lead: PSC

° Informal interagency working groups are presently in existence addressing polygraph research and counterintelligence related aspects of foreign use of the polygraph.

III. ADDITIONAL LEGISLATION

C. DoD Use of Polygraph for CI Purposes

° Congress should consider permanent legislation authorizing DoD to use polygraph examinations for personnel security screening with CI-related questions, based on the most recent DoD proposal. If a decision cannot be reached in 1987 because of insufficient test data, then Congress should extend the current test program for fixed period.

P. 335, SSCI report (item 75). Lead: PSC

- The DoD Authorization Act now pending in Congress contains permanent legislation for such a program.

- Strongly support legislation that avoids limiting DoD to a year-to-year numerical ceiling for the conduct of its program. The Secretary of Defense should have the flexibility to employ resources involving polygraph examiners as he sees fit to maximize their contribution to personnel security, albeit with close and continuing Congressional oversight.

P. 39, President's report. Lead: PSC

- The DoD authorization Act now pending in Congress contains such legislation.

E. Enhancing the Value of Security Questionnaires

- Support the development of a legislative proposal which modifies Title 5 of the US Code to require Government employment applicants to reimburse the government for the cost of investigation should it be determined that entries on the personnel security questionnaire were knowingly falsely made or that material information was purposely withheld.

P. 40 President's report. Lead: PSC

- Future PSC tasks will address the proposed legislation.



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ATTACHMENT B

Listed below are initiatives requiring consideration for start-up (or in some cases continuing) action. They are presented in chronological sequence and keyed by number to Attachment A. []

STAT

UPGRADING PERSONNEL SECURITY

1.c. Prepare an executive branch plan, in consultation with civil liberties experts, for requiring those who receive access to the most sensitive information to agree to expanded post-access foreign travel reporting obligations and/or agency access to relevant financial and travel records. Such a plan should incorporate reasonable safeguards regarding the use of the information. []

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5.d. Improve the adjudication process for granting or denying security clearances, with (a) more rigorous standards regarding persons who have committed felony offenses: (b) follow-up measures where persons with admitted problems like drug use are cleared; and (c) a government-wide requirement for training of adjudicators. (d) For the most sensitive positions, a "select in" policy based on demonstrated aptitude for security should be adopted in place of the current "select out" policy based on the absence of proved disqualifying factors. []

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